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Psychological studies on fictional persuasion demonstrate that being engaged with fiction 
systematically affects our beliefs about the real world, in ways that seem insensitive to the 
truth. This threatens to undermine the widely accepted view that beliefs are essentially 
regulated in ways that tend to ensure their truth, and may tempt various non-doxastic 
interpretations of the belief-seeming attitudes we form as a result of engaging with 
fiction. In this paper, I evaluate this threat, and argue that it is benign. Even if the 
relevant attitudes are best seen as genuine beliefs, as I think they often are, their lack of 
appropriate sensitivity to the truth does not undermine the essential tie between belief 
and truth. To this end, I shall consider what I take to be the three most plausible models 
of the cognitive mechanisms underlying fictional persuasion, and argue that on none of 
these models does fictional persuasion undermine the essential truth-tie. 
I will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I provide an introduction to the relevant 
psychological findings on fictional persuasion, and briefly motivate what I will assume 
for the sake of argument in the remaining part of the paper, namely that the relevant 
attitudes caused by engaging with fiction should be seen as genuine beliefs. In Section 3, 
I introduce a number of versions of the widely accepted idea that beliefs are essentially 
regulated for truth, and explain why fictional persuasion may be seen to threaten this 
idea. To fix matters for the following discussion, I will in the end focus on the version of 
the essential truth regulation, according to which beliefs are essentially regulated by 
cognitive mechanisms that have as their biological proper function to ensure truth. In 
Section 4, I consider what I take to be the three most plausible explanatory models of the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying fictional persuasion, namely the model developed by 
Dan Gilbert and colleagues, a more parsimonious model recently suggested appealing to 
the availability heuristic, and a model that I adapt from theories of narrative as a distinct 
evolved cognitive process. I argue that all of these models make the psychological 
findings on fictional persuasion compatible with beliefs being essentially regulated for 
truth. Finally, in Section 5, I consider and reject an objection from fictional persuasion to 
my own preferred theory of the aim of belief, raised by Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Lisa 
Bortolotti in their contribution to this volume. 
  
 
2. Fictional Persuasion 
Psychological studies over the past 25 years have demonstrated that being engaged with 
fiction and narrative often affects our real world beliefs. This section will provide a brief 
overview of these findings.1  
In an early series of studies (Gerrig and Prentice 1991; Prentice et al. 1997; 
Prentice and Gerrig 1999; Wheeler et al. 1999), subjects read fictional stories containing 
various general statements, asserted as part of the fiction, but with real world application, 																																																								
1 I draw in this section on the excellent summary of the psychological findings in Friend (2014). 
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that were either true (e.g. ‘Mental illness is not contagious’) or false (e.g. ‘Mental illness is 
contagious’). The subjects were subsequently asked to answer a general knowledge 
questionnaire, and were found to agree with statements that were consistent with the 
fiction and disagree with statements that were inconsistent with the fiction, to a higher 
degree than subjects who had read an unrelated story. Other studies (Marsh et al. 2003; 
March and Fazio 2006; Butler et al. 2012) focused on the effect of statements contained 
in stories in a more peripheral way, and again, subjects were found to answer in 
accordance with the story in subsequent knowledge tests to a statistically significant 
higher degree than control groups. The same was found when subjects were asked 
questions the answer of which had to be derived from the story, rather than being 
explicitly contained in them.  
Strikingly, a study reported by Deborah A. Prentice and Richard J. Gerrig (1999) 
showed that subjects were more likely to be affected in these ways if they thought they 
were reading fiction, rather than a factual account: subjects in two groups read the same 
text, but in the one group, the text was labeled as fiction, while in the other the text was 
labeled as journalism. The persuasive effects were found to be higher in the group 
reading the text labeled as fiction. A similar result is reported by Jeffrey J. Strange (2002). 
It is also interesting to note that factors, which reduce persuasion in rhetorical contexts, 
such as higher intelligence and ‘need for cognition’, did not reduce fictional persuasion 
(Wheeler et al. 1999). 
 In a particularly influential study, Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock (2000) 
demonstrate a correlation between the degree of narrative effects on real world beliefs, 
and the degree to which subjects report being deeply absorbed into the narrative – a 
‘distinct mental process, and integrative melding of attention, imagery, and feelings’ 
(p.701) that Green and Brock call ‘transportation’. Level of transportation was measured 
according to subjects’ reporting of experiencing things such as ease of picturing events in 
the story, lack of attention of surroundings while reading, ability to picture themselves in 
the narrative, mental involvement, disability to put narrative out of their minds after 
reading it, emotional effects, interest in alternative endings, and more (p.704).   
In the study, Green and Brock had subjects read a short story, ‘Murder in the 
Mall’, and found that those reporting a high degree of transportation were subsequently 
more likely to assent to story-consistent statements, such as ‘The likelihood of death by 
stabbing in a mall is quite high’, ‘Psychiatric patients who live in an institution should not 
be allowed out in the community during the day’, ‘The world is violent and unjust’, etc. 
These findings were independent of whether the subjects thought they were reading 
fiction or non-fiction. 
 The nature of the statements assented to in the study by Green and Brock might 
tempt some to interpret the attitude change as a matter of change in non-doxastic states 
rather than beliefs. Especially the last two of the statements mentioned above invite this 
interpretation, since they are of a normative nature and therefore, according to some, not 
truth-apt, and thus unsuitable as contents of beliefs.2 But when seen together with the 
results of the previous studies, which focused on statements that clearly were truth-apt, it 
seems plausible to take Green and Brocks findings as corroborating the earlier ones.  
Another possible motivation for preferring a non-doxastic interpretation is the 
relative instability of the attitudes affected by fiction. Marsh et al. (2003) tested the 
effects after a delay, and the change in attitudes was found to be less pronounced, 
suggesting that the attitudes in question were of a less stable kind, such as temporary 
acceptance. However, when attitudes were tested both immediately after reading the 																																																								
2 This would be the preferred interpretation of non-cognitivists about normative statements. For an 
overview, see Mark Schroeder (2008). 
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fiction, and then again after a delay, the attitudes were retained to a higher degree, which 
suggests that the instability was a matter of lack of memory, rather than the nature of the 
attitudes (Friend 2014).  
While there may well be more to be said in favor of the non-doxastic 
interpretations of the studies on fictional persuasion, I shall assume for the sake of 
argument that the studies do demonstrate effects on genuine beliefs. My interest in this 
paper is to assess the tension between the findings on fictional persuasion and the idea 
that beliefs are essentially regulated for truth, on the assumption that the findings do 
indeed concern genuine beliefs. And while I grant that this assumption is not beyond 
doubt, it is plausible enough, I think, to warrant the project of this paper.3    
 Before moving on, I should set aside some more reliable ways in which reading 
fiction can lead to real world beliefs. It seems clear that a reader of fiction could adopt 
various conscious strategies for extracting reliable information from the fiction. Anna 
Ichino and Gregory Currie (this volume) point out, for example, that when it comes to 
certain background facts and scenarios for the stories played out in works of fiction, 
authors typically prefer to stick to the truth unless there is some special reason not to, 
and we typically think more highly of works of fiction that are truthful in this way. 
Although there are a number of pitfalls that one should steer clear of (cf. Friend 2014), 
this means that, for at least some of these background facts, we can rely on authors to 
form reliable beliefs on the assumption of their truthfulness. As pointed out by Dustin 
Stokes (2006), we can also rely on works of fiction as a source of modal knowledge about 
possibilities. Imagination is often thought to aid knowledge of possibility, since the ability 
to imagine the truth of some proposition can be taken as evidence that the proposition 
could be true.4 Since works of fiction help us imagine propositions and scenarios that we 
would not otherwise have imagined, or perhaps been able to imagine, they help us come 
to reliable beliefs about possibilities. Furthermore, as argued by James Young (this 
volume), the psychological phenomenon of ‘experience-taking’ described by Kaufman 
and Libby (2012), where readers of fiction spontaneously simulate the thoughts and 
emotions of fictional characters, can in some cases modify readers’ beliefs in 
epistemically reliable ways by enabling them to view the world from a new perspective. 
Finally, there is knowledge of the ‘deeper’ truths of morality and human psychology, of 
which the humanistic tradition in aesthetics credits art as a source (Gaut 2006). I mention 
these examples only to set them aside, however. My interest in this paper solely concerns 
the sort of beliefs and belief-forming processes uncovered by the psychological studies 
on fictional persuasion – beliefs that, at least initially, seem hostile to the idea that beliefs 
are essentially regulated for truth. I shall now turn to outline that idea.  
  
 
3. The Essential Truth-Tie and Misbelief 
 
3.1 The Essential Truth-Tie 
A prevailing assumption among belief theorists is that belief bears an essential relation to 
the truth. Normatively speaking, there is something successful or correct about a belief 
being true, and something defective or incorrect about false beliefs. Causally speaking, if 
someone’s attitude to some propositional is sufficiently unresponsive to the truth, or 
systematically fails to make the subject of the attitude behave in ways that would be 																																																								
3 See Sullivan-Bissett and Bortolotti (this volume), and Buckwalter and Tullman (this volume) for more 
comprehensive defenses of the doxastic interpretation. 
4 This idea is sometimes identified as the ‘conceivability thesis’ in the epistemology of modality. For an 
overview, see Vaidya (2007). 
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rational in light of the truth of its content, it becomes difficult to think that attitude as a 
genuine belief. These considerations seem basic to the nature of belief (Williams 1973).  
These general and vague ideas have been interpreted in a number of different 
ways, which has given rise to a number of competing theories of belief. We can approach 
the idea by first considering some weaker and inessential relationships between belief and 
the truth, that fail to demarcate belief from other attitudes (Velleman 2000). Observe 
first that believing some proposition p involves believing p to be true. This clearly does not 
set belief apart from other propositional attitudes – even conative propositional attitudes, 
such as desires, involve an attitude to the truth of a proposition. Desiring p, is desiring p 
to be true. We get closer to belief when we observe that believing p involves regarding p 
as true. Desires do not share this characteristic. But other cognitive attitudes do. 
Accepting, supposing, imagining, etc., arguably all involve regarding p as true. If the 
essential truth-tie is to demarcate belief, it must therefore consist in some stronger 
relation than this.  
The perhaps most parsimonious account of the essential truth-tie is purely 
functional/causal.5 A simple version of this account (helping ourselves now to an 
account of propositional content) identifies beliefs with, roughly, whatever propositional 
attitude that plays the functional role of being caused in ways that tend to ensure the 
truth of the propositional content, and of causing actions that tend to satisfy the 
believer’s desires if the content is true. It is widely accepted that causal relationships such 
as these do indeed capture an important aspect of belief. But many think that the 
functionalist account is nonetheless inadequate as it stands. One familiar problem is that 
the account fails to capture the normative flavor of the relation to truth. It is not simply 
an unexplained essential fact about belief that they are causally regulated for truth, and 
that they tend to cause actions that are successful when the beliefs are true. Rather, 
beliefs stand in these causal relationships because they thereby fulfill their normative or 
rational role (Zangwill 1998; Shah 2003). Indeed, it is only by a virtue of a prior 
understanding of this normative role that functionalists are able to identify the functional 
role of belief – not by careful empirical observation of causal patterns involving beliefs, 
but by reflection on the conditions under which beliefs would be rational or make other 
attitudes or actions rational (Davidson 1980). 
In order to account for issues such as these, many have been attracted to an 
account of the essential truth-tie that it purely normative.6 According to one such 
interpretation, beliefs are essentially such that they, in some sense, ought to be or are correct 
only if true. This sets belief apart from both conative and other cognitive attitudes of the 
kinds mentioned above. Although there is a sense in which it is good for one’s desires to 
become true, it is only good if it is the world that comes into conformity with one’s 
desire, rather than the other way around. Beliefs, by contrast, are correct when they 
conform to the world – a difference in what is known as ‘direction of fit’ (Anscombe 
1957). And when it comes to accepting, supposing, imagining, and the like, there doesn’t 
seem to be any good and general sense at all in which we prefer them to be true – for 
example, we often suppose some proposition to be true only in order to prove it false. 
But there are serious problems with the purely normative proposal. If the 
difference between beliefs and other sorts of attitudes is, at bottom, a normative one, 
beliefs have normative essences – they are constitutively normative. But in what sense of 
‘ought’ is it really the case that all beliefs, no matter the content or occasion, ought to be 
true? And how does an essentially normative account of belief fit within a naturalistic 																																																								
5 For a representative sample, see Putnam (1967), Lewis (1970), and Fodor (1981). 
6 For a representative sample, see Adler (2006), Boghossian (2008), Engel (2004), Fassio (2011), Shah and 
Velleman (2005), Wedgwood (2007), and Whiting (2010). For a recent overview, see McHugh and Whiting 
(2014). 
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account of psychology? It is also all but clear that the normative account succeeds on it’s 
own terms in solving the problem faced by the functionalist account. Just as the causal 
roles played by belief call for explanation, the normative roles of belief call for 
explanation too – we should be unsatisfied with an account that bottoms out in certain 
constitutive norms, the force of which themselves cry out for explanation.7  
An account seeking to ground the normative tie between belief and the truth in 
more fundamental features of belief, and at the same time explain its causal role, is the 
teleological account of belief, according to which believing p involves having as an aim or 
intention to believe p truly.8 Such an aim or intention gives rise to normative assessments, 
albeit of an instrumental nature, in the same way that having various practical aims could 
make some actions more suitable or rational relative to the aim, than others. This 
account has the advantage over the purely normative account of not involving any 
inherently normative aspect to belief, which would be problematic from a naturalistic 
perspective, while explaining the nature and relevance of evaluating beliefs in terms of 
truth.9 
It is a contested issue, however, how to best understand the nature of the aim 
involved with believing, on the teleological account. Although beliefs may sometimes be 
under the regulation of a literal aim or intention of a believer, the vast majority of beliefs 
clearly are not. David Velleman (2000) handled this difficulty by proposing that the aim 
of believing the truth can be realized not only at the personal level by literal intentions, 
but also at the sub-personal level by cognitive systems that have as their biologically proper 
function to ensure the truth of the beliefs that they regulate. This also remains my own 
preferred theory, and I have defended it in previous work from various objections (see 
footnote 9).  Other theorists have proposed proper function accounts of belief’s relation 
to truth independently of the role such functions might play in realizing the ‘aim’ 
postulated by teleologists.10  
In the bulk of this paper, I will focus on whether beliefs arising from fictional 
persuasion present a problem for the explanation of belief’s essential relation to truth in 
terms of biologically proper functions, and argue that they do not. I focus on this 
explanation in part because of its relative wide acceptance, and therefore interest; but 
since my own preferred account also involves appeal to mechanisms having as their 
biologically proper function to ensure the truth of beliefs, my defense of this idea also 
provides indirect support for my own account. However, in their contribution to this 
volume, Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Lisa Bortolotti argue that fictional persuasion presents 
a special problem of my aim based account. In the final section, I argue that it doesn’t. 
 
 
3.2 Proper function and misbelief 
It is no simple matter to state what it means for some organ, system, behavior, etc., to 
have some feature as its proper function. On Millikan’s (1984) influential account, the 
proper function of some x has to do with its etiology. Following Allan Hazlett’s (2013) 
useful statement of Millikan’s account, we may say that to ϕ is the biological proper 
function of x, where x is a part or feature of an organism o, whenever (i) the ancestors of 																																																								
7 For criticisms of the normative account of belief and other propositional attitudes, see Steglich-Petersen 
(2006a; 2008a; 2008b; 2011a; 2013a). 
8 For an influential statement of this account, see Velleman (2000). For further development and defense, 
see Steglich-Petersen (2006b; 2009; 2010; 2011b; 2013b; 2013c). 
9 That is not to say, of course, that the account is entirely unproblematic from a naturalistic perspective; 
intentionality remains naturalistically challenging. 
10 For a representative sample, see Millkan (1984), Papineau (1993), and Neander (1995), and Sullivan-
Bissett and Bortolotti (this volume).  
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o had x, or some ‘ancestor’ of x, and the fact that their x ϕ-ed provided them a 
reproductive advantage, (ii) there are genes for having x, and for having x that ϕ, and (iii) 
the truth of (i) and (ii) explains why o has x. 
This allows us to give a more precise characterization of truth being the proper 
function of belief, keeping in mind that this function is a matter of the cognitive systems 
regulating beliefs having as their proper function to ensure true belief. Following Hazlett 
(2013) again, this comes to the following: (i) the ancestors of humans had belief-
regulating cognitive systems, or ‘ancestors’ of such systems, and the fact that the 
cognitive systems ensured true beliefs provided them a reproductive advantage; (ii) there 
are genes for having cognitive systems, and for having cognitive systems that ensure true 
beliefs; and (iii) the truth of (i) and (ii) explains why humans have the belief-regulating 
cognitive systems that they have. 
 Given this characterization of the essential truth-tie, we can turn to formulating 
our main question anew. The question now becomes: do the psychological findings on 
fictional persuasion undermine the view that the proper function of belief is to be true? 
It is easy to see why one might suppose that the findings do undermine this view. It is of 
course compatible with ϕ-ing being the proper function of x, that x sometimes fails to ϕ. 
The existence of heart failure does not undermine that the proper function of hearts is to 
circulate blood. Proper functions are compatible even with quite pervasive failure, as in 
the case of sperm cells failing at staggering rates in reaching their target (Millikan 1984: 
34). But whenever the ‘failure’ becomes sufficiently systematic, it raises the question of 
whether it is a failure at all in the proper function sense. What is a systematic ‘failure’ 
when seen from the perspective of one function may turn out to instead be a surprising 
adaptation in response to an unconsidered problem, revealing the proper function to be 
something entirely different. To properly undermine the proper function, however, the 
‘failure’ must be shown to itself represent a heritable feature or behavior, that provided 
our ancestors with a reproductive advantage separate from that provided under the 
originally hypothesized proper function, such that it explains the current existence of that 
feature or behavior. The question, now, is whether the findings on fictional persuasion 
undermine truth as the proper function of belief in this way. 
The findings on fictional persuasion certainly do represent a pattern of belief 
formation that systematically fails to be truth-sensitive. Might this pattern reveal a 
surprising adaptive function of belief and belief-regulating systems that is insensitive or 
to the truth? Again, not necessarily: there are other systematic failures of cognitive 
systems to yield true beliefs that clearly are compatible with truth being their proper 
function. A stick that is half submerged in water appears bent, and this appearance will 
lead us to believe that it is bent unless we consciously correct for the refraction of light 
as it passes from the water to the air. This is a clear and systematic weakness of our 
perceptual belief forming system, when seen from the point of view of ensuring true 
beliefs. But no one would be tempted to say that this weakness reveals that the system 
has some alternative adaptive function, apart from ensuring true beliefs. There is no 
reproductive advantage to be had from having straight sticks appear to one as bent. We 
would rather explain this weakness as a matter of evolution economizing with our 
cognitive means. The advantage afforded by a perceptual system that corrects for 
refracting light simply doesn’t outweigh the cognitive cost of developing and running 
such a system. But this does nothing to undermine the view that what the perceptual 
system is selected to do, is to ensure true beliefs. To make a parallel, strong prescription 
lenses curve the light along the edges of the lens, causing a distorted impression when 
wearing them. But this is an accidental and regrettable feature of the lenses that we 
would rather be without or minimize, if it were possible or less expensive, and could thus 
hardly be said to be the function of the lenses. There is no easy argument, then, from 
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some systematic failure of a cognitive system in causing true beliefs, to truth not being 
the proper function of that system. To undermine truth as the proper function, we 
would have to show that the non-truth sensitive nature of the relevant cognitive system 
is heritable and provides a reproductive advantage other than the mere advantage of 
being ‘cheaper’ than a system that tracks the truth.  
To judge whether the findings on fictional persuasion undermine truth as the 
proper function, we must first understand the cognitive mechanisms at play in fictional 
persuasion. We must then try to determine whether the unreliability of those 
mechanisms is a matter of a truth-independent adaptation, in the above sense. 
Determining the psychological mechanisms in particular is no easy task, and not one that 
I can hope to carry out here with any confidence. Instead, I will consider three plausible 
candidates for the mechanism, some of which have been proposed in the literature, and 
ask for each of those whether they, if they indeed are responsible for fictional persuasion, 
undermine truth as the proper function of belief.  
 
 
4. Three Models of Fictional Persuasion and The Essential Truth-Tie 
 
4.1 The Gilbert Model 
The prevailing explanatory model in the psychological literature of the findings on 
fictional persuasion invokes a general model of belief formation suggested by Dan 
Gilbert and colleagues (1993). Gilbert et al. contrast the prevailing ‘Cartesian’ model of 
belief formation, with their preferred model inspired by Spinoza. On the Cartesian 
model, comprehension and belief formation are two distinct processes. When we hear or 
read some sentence, it is first processed for comprehension, thus yielding a propositional 
content, and only following this do we take up or reject the content for belief. Gilbert et 
al. contrast this view with the ‘Spinozan’ theory, according to which comprehension and 
belief formation are parts of one and the same cognitive process. When we hear or read a 
sentence, the content of the sentence is initially accepted as part of the comprehension 
process. It then requires subsequent processing to evaluate and possibly delete the 
acceptance, something that requires cognitive effort, and if the acceptance isn’t subjected 
to this active evaluation, it will linger and become a belief. The chief prediction of this 
theory is that when some event or factor stands in the way of someone ‘undoing’ the 
initial acceptance, he will continue to believe the content, even if it would be judged false 
upon consideration.  
In the original study motivating this model, subjects were thus exposed to false 
information about a criminal defendant or a college student to see whether various 
distractions would have an effect on subsequent belief. Some subjects were exposed to 
this information while under cognitive load, others under time pressure. They were then 
asked to make judgments related to the defendant or student, and it was found that both 
load and time pressure caused subjects to believe the false information and to use it in 
making consequential decisions about the target. Gilbert et al. took these findings to 
confirm their model, on the interpretation that both manipulations prevented subjects 
from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during 
comprehension. Although there are clearly other possible interpretations of the findings 
that do not support Gilbert et al.’s model, I shall not pursue those here. 
 It is easy see how Gilbert’s model might be recruited to explain the findings on 
fictional persuasion. The model does not predict, of course, that all of the beliefs formed 
as part of the comprehension process will persist. It only predicts that the beliefs linger 
when various circumstances, such as cognitive load or time pressure, prevent us from 
weeding out beliefs as we go along. But engagement with a fictional story, and more 
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specifically fictional ‘transportation’, can easily be seen as one such distracting 
circumstance. As our attention becomes absorbed by the narrative, and our critical 
vigilance lowered as a result of being aware that one is engaging with fiction rather than 
statements of fact, we become less prone to weeding out the acceptances that are formed 
in the process of comprehending the sentences making up the fictional story, and some 
of them thus end up as beliefs. 
 There are a number of reasons to doubt this explanation (see Ichino and Currie 
(this volume) for a brief discussion). For one, it is unclear in what sense one could 
automatically believe everything one reads and hears, since it is unclear what content one 
would believe. As Sperber et al. (2010) point out, it always takes pragmatic processing to 
work out what content utterances or written words signify, which means that at least part 
of the comprehension process must take place prior to the adoption of acceptance or 
belief. Gilbert’s model also makes it difficult to explain why we are more prone to adopt 
belief in some parts of fictional contents than others. In particular, we are more likely to 
take up belief in fictional contents that form part of the fictional background, rather than 
in contents that are part of the main narrative. But why that should be so is unclear on 
Gilberts model. However, I shall not attempt to evaluate the explanation based on 
Gilbert’s model here. The relevant question presently is whether fictional persuasion 
undermines truth as the proper function of belief, on the assumption that the Gilbert 
model correctly identifies the cognitive mechanisms responsible for fictional persuasion. 
 Why would evolution have favored a one-process rather than a two-process 
approach for comprehension and belief-formation? Why would evolution have favored 
initially believing everything one sees or hears, and only subsequently weeding out faulty 
beliefs, rather than letting all possible contents for beliefs pass through a gatekeeping 
system before we take up belief in them? One obvious explanation is cognitive economy. 
Critically evaluating contents for belief is a costly process. The potential benefit to be 
gained from this process is an increased probability of ending up with a true belief. But if 
a sufficiently high proportion of the contents one sees or hears are truthful already, there 
may be little to be gained from critically evaluating all of the contents, compared to the 
cost. For example, if 95 percent of what one sees or hears is truthful as it is, critically 
evaluating all contents is a high price for whatever modest increase in proportion of true 
belief one could gain as a result. On the one-process strategy, the subsequent evaluation 
could then select which beliefs to evaluate, based, for example, on the stakes involved 
with those particular beliefs, so as to ensure a high payoff on the cognitive effort. If this 
explanation of the one-process approach is right, and the one-process approach is what 
underlies fictional persuasion, beliefs from fiction no more undermine truth as the 
proper function of belief, than optical illusions do. They are the result of a cost 
conscious cognitive system that nevertheless has as its function to yield true beliefs.  
Another obvious explanation of why evolution might have favored the one-
process approach is speed. It is often beneficial to be able to act quickly on new 
information. But if all information must be evaluated for truth before it can be acted on, 
we are more likely to act too late to avoid whatever danger or attain whatever benefit 
indicated by the information. Add to this that acting on false information in cases where 
speed is of the essence will tend to be less costly – one can jump to avoid a snake-shaped 
branch many times before the cost of this outweighs the cost of being bitten by a snake 
reacted to too slowly. This means that there may be asymmetrical costs to sometimes 
acting on false information compared to acting too late on the information one has. This 
is a cost structure familiar from the literature on error management, studying situations 
with asymmetrical costs to adopting false positives and negatives.11 For example, it has 																																																								
11 See e.g. Stich (1990), Haselton and Buss (2000), and Haselton (2007). 
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been suggested that men overestimate sexual interest in women because of asymmetrical 
costs to believing there to be interest when there is none (low cost), and believing there 
not be interest when there is (high opportunity cost). But it is also a familiar point from 
this literature that adapting to such cost structures in one’s beliefs does nothing to 
undermine that our cognitive systems has as their function to ensure truth. Less fallible 
systems would all else being equal have been more adaptive, but their high cost would 
not outweigh the benefits (Hazlett 2013). Nevertheless, for all their fallibility, these 
systems have the biological function of producing true belief.  
In sum, fictional persuasion does not seem to undermine truth as the proper 
function of belief, on the assumption that the Gilbert model correctly identifies the 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for fictional persuasion. 
 
 
4.2 The Availability Heuristic Model 
The second candidate mechanism for explaining the findings on fictional persuasion 
involves what is known as the ‘availability’ heuristic, described in Amos Tverski and 
Daniel Kahneman’s classic study (1973). An explanation appealing to this is briefly 
suggested by Ichino and Currie (this volume). The availability heuristic is a hard to 
suppress mental shortcut that relies on ease of cognitive retrieval when making 
judgments about frequencies of classes or the probability of events. This can lead to 
biases in such judgments, insofar as recent examples or experiences are easier to retrieve 
than more distant ones.  
 Again, it is fairly obvious how the availability heuristic might be recruited to 
explain the findings on fictional persuasion. Engaging with fiction makes available 
examples of events, classes, associations, etc., and will thus make those examples salient 
and easy to retrieve for subsequent judgments of frequency and probability. As Ichino 
and Currie point out, Tverski and Kahneman in fact rely on the heuristic to explain a 
phenomenon very similar to that found in the later studies on fictional persuasion, 
namely that subjects rated nuclear war as more likely after having seen a movie depicting 
it, even though they were aware that the movie was fictional. If this phenomenon is 
indeed to be explained by the availability heuristic, it shows that this heuristic is blind to 
the distinction between real and fictional sources of information, thus lending support to 
the idea that the heuristic is what is responsible for the more general findings on fictional 
persuasion. 
 There are also reasons to be skeptical about this explanation, however. Why, for 
example, should the degree of transportation matter to fictional persuasion, if the 
heuristic is simply based on certain examples or associations being easily available for 
retrieval? At least, some supplementary explanation would be needed to account for the 
role of transportation, appealing perhaps to the effect that transportation has on 
memory. It is also doubtful that the availability heuristic is able to explain the variety of 
beliefs affected by fictional persuasion. The heuristic is most relevant in forming 
judgments of frequency and probability, and less likely to affect particular judgments, at 
least as the heuristic is usually and originally understood. To explain these latter kinds of 
judgments, we would thus have to suppose a more extended version of the heuristic, or 
introduce other mechanisms as supplements. However, as above, I shall not attempt to 
evaluate the explanation based on the availability heuristic here. The relevant question is 
whether fictional persuasion undermines truth as the proper function of belief, on the 
assumption that this explanation correctly identifies the cognitive mechanisms 
responsible for fictional persuasion. 
 It should be fairly obvious, however, that the availability heuristic does not threaten 
truth as the proper function of belief, from which it follows that fictional persuasion 
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presents no such threat either, if it can be explained by the availability heuristic. As 
Tverski and Kahneman themselves in effect pointed out, any cognitive bias caused by 
the availability heuristic is a side-effect of what is normally a reliable strategy for arriving 
at reasonable estimates of frequency and probability. The heuristic is based on the 
essentially sound rule that ‘instances of large classes are recalled better and faster than 
instances of less frequent classes, that likely occurrences are easier to imagine than 
unlikely ones, and that associative connections are strengthened when two events 
frequently co-occur’ (1973: 208). This means that a person with some reliability can rely 
on ease of retrieval and mental association when making frequency and probability 
estimates. The potential bias caused by the strategy stems from the fact that ease of 
retrieval and mental association is also affected by less relevant (although not altogether 
irrelevant) factors, such as how recently one has experienced the relevant event or 
association between events. This means that when we rely on ease of retrieval, we run 
the risk of relying on the less relevant factor of recent experience rather than the more 
relevant factor of frequent experience. The reason we have evolved to rely on this 
imperfect strategy is, of course, that the cost of inaccuracy and bias in the judgments 
caused by the heuristic is outweighed by the benefits of speed and cognitive frugality. But 
this does not mean that there is something adaptive about the inaccuracy in itself, or that 
the inaccurate judgments possess some other truth-independent property, apart from 
being fast and frugal, that have promoted their evolutionary selection. So on the 
assumption that fictional persuasion is explained by the availability heuristic, it does not 
undermine truth as the proper function of belief.     
 
 
4.3 Fictional Persuasion as an Evolved Cognitive Process 
Whereas the previous two candidate explanations of fictional persuasion appealed to 
general features and mechanisms of human cognition, the last candidate explanation that 
I want to consider is tailored more specifically to explain cognitive processing of fiction 
and narrative.  
Michelle S. Sugiyama (2001) summarizes research pointing to a number of 
features of our ability for narrative processing that supports regarding it as a relatively 
specialized evolutionary adaptation. For one thing, narrative is a universal cross-cultural 
phenomenon, existing in some form in all human societies, whether literal or not, in a 
comparable state of elaboration regardless of their state of technological advancement. 
The capacity to process and understand narrative is also universal across individuals 
within cultures, reliably developing without formal instruction around the age of 2½ or 3 
years, with the ability to distinguish narrative and non-narrative uses of language 
developing even earlier (e.g. Sutton-Smith 1986). This is not what we should expect if 
narrative were a cultural invention.12 Furthermore, there is a striking thematic 
resemblance in the content of narratives across cultures, with certain universal topics and 
themes to do with cosmology, topography, animal behavior, plant characteristics, life and 
death, sex, marriage, deception and violence (e.g. Aarne 1961). Finally, but not least, 
narrative is a highly complex cognitive process, relying on the integration of a host of 
more specialized cognitive operations, including theory of mind, causal reasoning, spatial 
reasoning, and language. All of this indicates that narrative meets the standard 
requirements of specialized adaptive design – ‘it is species typical, reliably developing, 
and exhibits a degree of complexity that is unlikely to have arisen by chance’ (Sugiyama 
2001: 222; cf. Williams 1966). 																																																								
12 This does not mean that there couldn’t be more specific cultural norms or institutions governing 
engagement with works of fiction, as suggested by e.g. Peter Lamarque (this volume) or Eva-Maria Konrad 
(this volume); it only means that narrative in general is not a cultural invention. 
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This on its own is does not suffice to explain the findings on fictional persuasion. 
But the contours of an explanation begin to reveal themselves when we consider what 
specific challenges narrative might have evolved as an adaptation for. The first key to 
unraveling this is the context in which narrative developed. Reviewing a number of 
sources, Sugiyama places the development of narrative well before the emergence of 
agriculture, and therefore in a context where people depended on foraging for 
subsistence (2001: 223). This means that the selection pressures leading to the 
development of narrative were those faced by foragers. One of the main challenges to 
which narrative provided a solution in this context, argues Sugiyama, was the high cost 
involved in first-hand information acquisition for foraging purposes. Acquiring 
information first hand was costly and often dangerous, requiring substantial investments 
of time and energy, frequently without paying off by leading to sources of food. This 
means that foragers were critically dependent on cooperating in information gathering, 
and on developing effective means for transferring and storing information gathered by 
others. Although there may be other adaptive functions of narrative as well, such as 
social indoctrination and manipulation, Sugiyama argues that the primary adaptive 
function of narrative was to solve this problem. 
 Why would narrative be especially apt for this purpose? A number of features 
can be listed that points to narrative as an effective solution to a number of constraints 
on information acquisition (Sugiyama 2001: 228): narrative processing requires no 
physical exertion; narrative compresses time; narrative is a representation of experience 
from the point of view of a narrator; narrative provides an effective vehicle for 
information storage; narratives are highly memorable (Sperber (1985) points out that we 
easily recall stories that are comparable in informational complexity to 20-digit numbers); 
and narrative appears well designed for comprehensive simulation of human habitat. To 
these features we may add that narrative is often highly goal oriented, following 
recognizable patterns of problem descriptions and solutions that can easily be 
remembered, and that narrative often causes emotional responses that can serve as 
amplifiers of experience and anchors for memory. 
 Although Sugiyama does not discuss the findings on fictional persuasion, or the 
role of transportation in causing beliefs, it is easy to see how they would fit with the 
above picture. In general, if the original adaptive function of narrative was to transfer 
information, it should come as no surprise that we are disposed to take up beliefs when 
processing narrative. More specifically, the various scale items used by Green and Brock 
to measure degree of transportation (ease of picturing events, lack of attention of 
surroundings, ability to picture oneself in narrative, mental involvement, emotional 
effects, interest in alternative endings, etc.) are all factors that we would consider highly 
effective in aiding transfer of information, if that is indeed the intention in a given act of 
communication. Just consider trying to give someone a set of complex instructions on 
how to solve a problem or reach a certain goal, in a way that will allow the listener to 
carry out these instructions by relying on the memory of what you say alone. Surely, we 
would expect this to be more successful if our instructions were put in a way that 
disposed the listener to picture what you describe, focus attention on your description, 
picture himself in your description, become emotionally invested, form counterfactual 
thoughts about various aspects of your description, etc. 
As above, I will not at present attempt a full development and evaluation of the 
explanation of fictional persuasion in terms of narrative as an adapted response to the 
problem of information acquisition. Needless to say, the proposal raises a number of 
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questions that I cannot consider here.13 The relevant issue for our purposes is whether 
fictional persuasion undermines truth as the proper function of belief, on the assumption 
that this explanation correctly identifies the cognitive mechanisms responsible for 
fictional persuasion, and we already have enough material to venture a cautious answer to 
that question – namely that it doesn’t. In fact, if narrative processing were an adaptation 
for aiding information acquisition, the findings on fictional persuasion seem to support 
truth as the proper function of belief, rather than undermine it. This is compatible with 
the fact that fictional persuasion now, given our currently dominant uses of fiction, 
namely as entertainment, is an adversary factor in the efforts of our cognitive systems to 
ensure true beliefs. But all this means is that narrative processing has been adopted for a 
use that it didn’t (primarily) evolve to serve, namely entertainment. We can compare this 
claim to similar claims in the literature concerning other apparently unreliable cognitive 
mechanisms. Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer (2002) argue, for example, that 
various cognitive heuristics that seem unreliable under certain test-conditions, and in 
conditions often encountered in modern life, are in fact reliable in the right 
environments, and that these might be the environments in which the heuristics evolved. 
The heuristics thus fail to show that beliefs are regulated by mechanisms not functioning 
to yield true beliefs. In the same vein, if unreliable fictional persuasion is a byproduct of a 
reliable and effective mechanism for information transfer, the fact that it now (mostly) 




5. Fictional Persuasion and Teleology 
I have argued that beliefs from fiction do not undermine the idea that truth is the proper 
function of belief. As mentioned earlier, I also take this as support for my own preferred 
account of the aim of belief, according to which this aim can be realized both at the 
personal level by literal intentions, and at the sub-personal level by cognitive systems that 
have as their biologically proper function to ensure the truth of the beliefs that they 
regulate. However, in their contribution to this volume, Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Lisa 
Bortolotti argue that fictional persuasion represents a special problem of the aim based 
account. In this final section, I argue that it doesn’t. 
 Sullivan-Bissett and Bortolotti’s objection is a strengthened version of Nishi 
Shah’s ‘teleologist’s dilemma’. According to Shah, any plausible theory of belief must 
explain what he calls ‘doxastic transparency’, namely that ‘the deliberative question 
whether to believe that p inevitably gives way to the factual question whether p, since the 
answer to the latter question will determine the answer to the former’ (Shah 2006: 481; 
see also Shah 2003). Shah claims that his own normative theory of belief can explain 
transparency as a manifestation of believers’ commitment to the norm that believing p is 
correct if and only if p is true. Doxastic deliberation is framed by the concept of belief, 
and according to Shah, anyone competent with this concept must accept and reason in 
accordance with the truth-norm, thus resulting in transparency.  
The teleologist, however, faces an intractable dilemma, according to Shah (2003). 
On the one hand, the teleologist must recognize that the concept of belief encompasses 
not only attitudes that are strictly regulated for truth, but also non-deliberative attitudes 
that are more imperfect in their truth-regulation. But if that is the case, it becomes 
unclear why being framed by the concept of belief should make doxastic deliberation 
exhibit transparency, in the strong way described by Shah. Why should the sensitivity to 																																																								
13 To mention one pertinent question, raised by an anonymous reviewer, how does the proposal account 
for the fact that we only believe a small and select proportion of propositions in fiction? 
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truth in doxastic deliberation not be of the weaker kind, exhibited by non-deliberative 
belief formation? On the other hand, if the teleologist increases the level of truth 
regulation required for attitudes to count as beliefs, so as to account for transparency, the 
position will exclude many plausible instances of belief. The teleologist thus seems to 
face a dilemma. 
My original response to this dilemma in my (2006a) built on the observation 
(which Shah acknowledges) that transparency of course doesn’t entail that doxastic 
deliberation will always be settled in ways that are in fact sensitive to the truth, since the 
deliberator might be mistaken or biased, or otherwise confused in determining the truth. 
Transparency merely shows that believers always settle doxastic deliberation by settling to 
their own satisfaction whether the target proposition is true, however feeble their ability in 
doing so might be, which is perfectly compatible with de facto weak and imperfect truth-
regulation. So the framing by the concept of belief should only explain why doxastic 
deliberators attempt to let their deliberation be decided by determining the truth of the 
relevant proposition. Once we realize this, the air of a dilemma vanishes. There is no 
tension between the obvious fact that one can count as believing p while failing to 
believe p truly, or even failing in believing p in a way that is particularly sensitive to the 
truth, and the idea that we in doxastic deliberation aim strictly at forming a true belief. 
The level of de facto truth-regulation required for an attitude to count as a belief can thus 
be quite low, even if transparency is driven by a strict concern for the truth from the 
believers’ own perspective. 
Sullivan-Bissett and Bortolotti object, however, that beliefs from fiction represent 
a class of beliefs that is so extremely insensitive to the truth, that it becomes implausible 
to think that there is a standard of truth-regulation common to all beliefs, that will at 
once allow beliefs from fiction as genuine beliefs, and explain doxastic transparency. 
Sullivan-Bissett and Bortolotti accept that the de facto level truth-regulation present in 
cases of transparency is lower than it appears to be from the deliberator’s own 
perspective, but they still think that it is too high to be accounted for by the very low 
standard of regulation needed to include beliefs from fiction as beliefs. 
In response to this objection, I should say first of all that I longer think that the 
teleologist is saddled with explaining transparency as described by Shah. As I argue in my 
(2013a), in cases where the question whether to believe that p is transparent to whether p is true, 
the former question is most plausibly interpreted as a question about truth expressed in 
terms of belief, in which case transparency shouldn’t be explained in terms of the 
concept of belief at all. If that is the case, there is no ‘teleologist’s dilemma’, and no 
strengthened version of it either. However, for the sake of argument, I will also consider 
Sullivan-Bissett and Bortolotti’s objection on the assumption that transparency as 
described by Shah is a genuine phenomenon. Even granting this, however, I think that 
the following three considerations make it clear that their objection fails. 
 The first consideration, which is also relevant to the main discussion of this 
paper, is that although beliefs from fiction are formed in ways that seem systematically 
insensitive to the truth, nothing in the studies on fictional persuasion shows that these 
beliefs continue to be systematically insensitive to the truth after their formation. They do 
not show, for example, that beliefs from fiction are likely to subsequently persist in light 
of clear evidence of their falsity, or that they would be more resistant to argument than 
beliefs formed in more standard ways. Clearly, both of these aspects of truth regulation 
affect whether an attitude should count as a belief, and it is hard to see why truth-
insensitive attitude formation couldn’t be counterbalanced by subsequent truth-sensitive 
regulation, when determining whether the attitude counts as a belief. Sullivan-Bissett and 
Bortolotti would have to motivate this idea if their objection is to succeed. 
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 Secondly, Sullivan-Bissett and Bortolotti appear to overestimate the level of de 
facto truth regulation that must be present in cases of transparency. I think that it is clear 
that this level can be very low indeed. Just think of a person who is so confused or biased 
in his reasoning, that none of the consideration that he takes as relevant to whether p is 
true are in fact even remotely relevant (perhaps he regards patterns on a piece of toasted 
bread as decisive evidence of the existence of God). The de facto level of sensitivity to the 
truth in such cases of belief formation is extremely low; yet, the doxastic reasoning of 
such a person could easily exhibit transparency, since he may well settle on whether to 
believe that p by determining, to his own satisfaction, whether p is true.  
Thirdly, on the teleological account, it isn’t the de facto level of truth-regulation 
present in all beliefs that explain transparency. To put it somewhat simply, transparency 
is explained by a fact about what agents try to do in doxastic deliberation (namely, 
coming to a true belief), not by how well believers in fact succeed in this. So the minimal 
level of truth-regulation present in all beliefs does not play this explanatory role at all. It 
is hard to say anything precise about what the minimal required level is, which is also 
apparent from the main discussion of this paper. But the discrepancy between beliefs 
formed through transparent deliberation, and beliefs from fiction, does not raise any 




I have argued that the psychological findings on fictional persuasion do not undermine 
the idea that truth is the proper function of belief, even though they represent an 
example of beliefs being systematically insensitive to the truth. None of the most 
plausible candidates for cognitive mechanisms underlying fictional persuasion can 
plausibly be seen as selected by evolution for their tendency to cause false or unreliable 
beliefs, even if they, as in the case of fictional persuasion, often do. As argued in the end, 
the findings on fictional persuasion also do not undermine the truth-aim teleological 
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